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Abstract The newsvendor problem is a classical topic in Management Science
and Operations Research. It deals with purchases and price strategies when a least
one deadline is involved. In this paper we will assume that the decision is driven by
an optimization problem involving both expected prots and risks. As a main novelty,
risks will be given by a convex risk measure, including the usual utility functions. This
approach will allow us to nd necessary and su¢ cient optimality conditions under very
general frameworks, since we will not need any specic assumption about the demand
distribution.
Key words News vendor problem, Risk, Convex risk measure, Utility function,
Saddle point conditions.
A.M.S. Classication. 90B50, 91B06 90C25.
J.E.L. Classication. M50, M21, M30.
1 Introduction
The newsvendor problem is a classical topic in Management Science and Opera-
tions Research (Xu et al., 2010, Xu and Lu, 2013etc.). It deals with purchase
and price strategies when a least one deadline is involved, and it will not be
possible to sell after that date. Sometimes, several maturities (or deadlines)
are considered, in which case decisions may become multi-period and maybe
dynamic. An interesting overview of the State of the Art may be found in Choi
(2012).
The decision maker (i:e:, the newsvendor) usually faces an optimization
problem involving some utility function or the usual (risk, prot) pair. In the
second case, risk is usually measured by dispersions (variance, mainly) with re-
spect to expected values, but more recently, risk measure beyond the variance
have been considered. For instance, Gotoh and Takano (2007) use the Condi-
tional Value at Risk (Rockafellar et al, 2006), and Choi and Ruszczyn´ski (2008)
and Choi et al (2011) deal with more general coherent risk measures in the sense
of Artzner et al ( 1999).
In this paper we will propose to deal with convex risk measures (see, amongst
others, Kupper and Svindland, 2011) for several reasons. Firstly, every coherent
risk measure is convex, and therefore the analysis becomes more general. Sec-
ondly, the minimization of convex risk measures contains the maximization of
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B(x; p) is given by (2) and IE () denotes mathematical expectation, and to mini-
mize the risk  (B(x; p)). In other words, he/she will deal with the optimization
problem 8>><>>:
Max IE

p

D(p)  (D(p)  x)+

  Px

Min 

p

D(p)  (D(p)  x)+

  Px

x  0; p  P
(3)
(x; p) being the decision variable. Problem (3) is a classical Prot/Risk problem
usual in Portfolio Selection , Optimal Reinsurance, Newsvendor Problems, etc.
The main novelty is that we are involving a very general risk measure containing
every coherent risk measure (Artzner et al, 1999), every expectation bounded
risk measure (Rockafellar et al, 2006) and many convex risk measures (Kupper
and Svindland, 2011, and see the appendix). Since (3) contains two objective
functions, the decision maker will be looking for Pareto solutions, and most of
them can be obtained by minimizing scalar problems U (B(x; p))  IE (B(x; p)),
U > 0 denoting the relative importance of the risk  (B(x; p)) with respect to
the expected prot IE (B(x; p)) (Nakayama et al, 1985).4 Consequently, (3)
may become8>><>>: Min
8<: U

p

D(p)  (D(p)  x)+

  Px

 IE

p

D(p)  (D(p)  x)+

  Px

x  0; p  P
(4)
In order to deal with (4) we will follow the approach of Balbás et al (2010).
Thus, bearing in mind the representation (9) of , (4) is equivalent to
Min U   IE (y)
8><>:
  hy; zi+ k; 8 (z; k) 2 
y = p

D(p)  (D(p)  x)+

  Px
x  0; p  P
(5)
(; x; p) being the decision variable. Actually, these authors show that (x; p)
solves (4) if and only if there exists  such that (; x; p) solves (5) in which
case the equality
 = 

p

D(p)  (D(p)  x)+

  Px

holds. In order words,  may be interpreted as the risk that the newsvendor is
facing. Consequently, the decision variable (; x; p) represents
(Risk; Selected_Demand; Selected_Pr ice) :
4The higher the value of U , the higher the importance of the global risk.
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3 Dual approach and saddle point optimality
conditions
Problem (5) is much easier to study than the equivalent newsvendor Problem
(4). The main reason is the simplication of the objective function, which
contains the analytically complex function  if one deals with (4) but becomes
simple and liner in (5). As a consequence, under appropriate assumptions the
methodology of Balbás et al (2010) applies in order to solve (5). Accordingly,
one can consider the dual function of (5), given by
	 (z; k) = Min   IE (y) + U (hy; zi+ k)
(
y = p

D(p)  (D(p)  x)+

  Px
x  0; p  P
and the dual problem of (5), given by
Max 	 (z; k)
(z; k) 2  (6)
Both (5) and (6) satisfy the standard properties and have the same optimal
value. In other words, the inequality 	 (z; k)  U   IE (y) holds for feasible
solutions and 	 (z; k)  U  IE (y) holds for the optimal values. Moreover,
(6) is solvable.
The relationships above between (5) and (6) imply the existence of sad-
dle point necessary and su¢ cient optimality conditions for both problems. If
(x; p) is (4)-feasible, (z; k) is (6)-feasible and y = p

D(p)  (D(p)  x)+

 
Px then (x; p; z; k) is said to be a saddle point of (4) if
 IE (y) + U (hy; zi+ k) 
 IE (y) + U (hy; zi+ k) 
 IE (y) + U (hy; zi+ k)
(7)
holds for every (4)-feasible (x; p), every (6)-feasible (z; k) and every random
variable y = p

D(p)  (D(p)  x)+

  Px. According to Balbás et al ( 2010),
if (x; p) is (4)-feasible, (z; k) is (6)-feasible and the equality of random vari-
ables y = p

D(p)  (D(p)  x)+

  Px holds, then (x; p) solves (4)
and (z; k) solves (6) if and only if they are feasible and (x; p; z; k) satises
the saddle point condition (7).
4 Conclusion
In this paper we propose a new methodology allowing us to solve the news
vendor problem in a very general setting, since there are no specic assumptions
about the distribution of the random demand. The methodology is inspired in
previous ndings of Financial Theory and applies when the newsvendor deals
4
with a convex risk measure in order to control the risk level of her/his decisions.
The use of convex risk measures may be interesting because they are totally
compatible with the maximization of a standard utility function.
5 Appendix (approximation of convex functions)
Let us proof the results used in this paper related the representation of convex
functions. Thus, consider a Banach space Y and its dual Z. Represent by hy; zi
the usual bilinear product. The weak topologies will be denoted by  (Y; Z) and
 (Z; Y ), respectively.5
First we will study the CWCS functions
Theorem A1. Let  : Y ! IR be an arbitrary function. The assertions
below are equivalent:
a) There exists a convex and  (Z; Y )  compact set   Z such that
 (y) = Max fhy; zi ; z 2 g (8)
for every y 2 Y .
b)  is continuous, sub-additive ( (y1 + y2)   (y1) +  (y2)) and positive
homogeneous (  (y) =  (y) if   0).
If so,  is the unique convex and  (Z; Y )  compact subset of Z satisfying
(8).
Proof. This results was proved in Balbás et al (2013), among others. 
Denition A2. Let  : Y ! IR be an arbitrary function.  is said to be
CWCS (convex with compact sub-gradient) if there exists a convex set  
Z  IR, which is compact in the weak topology of  (Z  IR; Y  IR), and such
that
 (y) = Max fhy; zi+ k; (z; k) 2 g (9)
holds for every y 2 Y . An arbitrary real valued function  : Y  ! IR is said to
be convex if
 (ty1 + (1  t) y2)  t (y1) + (1  t)  (y2)
holds for every y1; y2 2 Y and every 0  t  1.It is straightforward to see that
every CWCS function is convex. 
Theorem A3.  : Y ! IR is a CWCS function if and only if there
exists another function ' : Y  IR ! IR, continuous, sub-additive and positive
homogeneous such that  (y) = ' (y; 1) holds for every y 2 Y . In particular,
every CWCS function is continuous. Furthermore, if ' : Y  IR ! IR and
 : Y  IR ! IR satisfy the condition above, then ' (y; r) =  (y; r) holds for
every y 2 Y and every r  0.
5Details about Banach spaces and related results may be found in Luenberger (1969) or
Kopp (1984).
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Proof. Suppose that  is CWCS. Consider the Banach space Y  IR, its
dual Z  IR and the convex and  (Z  IR; Y  IR) compact set   Z  IR.
Dene
' (y; r) = Max fhy; zi+ rk; (z; k) 2 g (10)
for every (y; r) 2 Y  IR. Theorem A1 guarantees that ' is continuous, sub-
additive and positive homogeneous. Moreover (9) and (10) guarantee the ful-
llment of the equality  (y) = ' (y; 1).
Conversely, Theorem A1, the existence of ' and the equality  (y) = ' (y; 1)
imply that (9) holds, and therefore  is CWCS.
Lastly, suppose that  : Y  IR ! IR satises the same conditions as '. If
r > 0 then
 (y; r) = r (y=r; 1) = r (y=r) = r' (y=r; 1) = ' (y; r) :
If r = 0 then
 (y; 0) = Limn!1 (y; 1=n) = Limn!1' (y; 1=n) = ' (y; 0) :

Theorem A4. If  : Y ! IR is a CWCS function and   Z  IR and
@  Z  IR are convex and  (Z  IR; Y  IR) compact sets satisfying (9), then
Z () = Z (@) and
Max fk; 9z 2 Z with (z; k) 2 g = Max fk; 9z 2 Z with (z; k) 2 @g (11)
Z being the natural projection of Z  IR over Z.
Proof. Equality (11) becomes obvious because (9) shows that both expres-
sions equal  (0). In order to prove Z () = Z (@), suppose that the equality
is false, i:e:, suppose that Z () 6= Z (@). Dene the functions
' (y; r) = Max fhy; zi+ rk; (z; k) 2 g
and
'@ (y; r) = Max fhy; zi+ rk; (z; k) 2 @g
for every (y; r) 2 Y  IR, and the functions
 (y) = Max fhy; zi ; z 2 Z ()g
and
@ (y) = Max fhy; zi ; z 2 Z (@)g
for every y 2 Y . Theorem A1 proves that these functions are continuous, sub-
additive and positive homogeneous. The same Theorem implies the inequality
 6= @ because Z () 6= Z (@). Since  and @ satisfy (9), Theorem A3
implies that ' (y; r) = '@ (y; r) if r  0. In particular,
' (y; 0) = '@ (y; 0)
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for every y 2 Y , i:e:,
Max fhy; zi ; (z; k) 2 g = Max fhy; zi ; (z; k) 2 @g
for every y 2 Y . The latter equality trivially leads to
Max fhy; zi ; z 2 Z ()g = Max fhy; zi ; z 2 Z (@)g ;
which contradicts  6= @ . 
Next, let us show that every convex and continuous function has a CWCS
approximation.
Lemma A5. If  is convex and continuous, and we consider the sub-
gradient set
@ = f(z; k) 2 Z  IR; hy; zi+ k   (y) 8y 2 Y g (12)
then @ is convex and  (Z; Y ) closed (and therefore closed if  (Z; Y ) is re-
placed by the norm topology), and
 (y) = Sup fhy; zi+ k; (z; k) 2 @g (13)
holds for every y 2 Y .
Proof. It is very easy to see that @ is convex if so is , and @ is obviously
 (Z; Y ) closed. The inequality  (y)  Sup fhy; zi+ k; (z; k) 2 @g is obvious
too, so let us prove the opposite inequality. Consider y0 2 Y and " > 0, and
it is su¢ cient to see that  (y0)   "  Sup fhy; zi+ k; (z; k) 2 @g. Obviously,
(y0;  (y0)  ") =2 A, where
A = f(y; r) 2 Y  IR; r   (y)g :
Since  is continuous, it is easy to see that A is closed, and A is convex because
so is . Therefore, the Hahn-Banach Separation Theorem proves the existence
of (z0; k) 2 Z  IR non null and such that
hy; z0i+ rk  hy0; z0i+ k ( (y0)  ")
for every (y; r) 2 A. It is easy to see that k  0 since otherwise the latter
inequality could not hold if r ! 1. Moreover, k = 0 is not possible either,
since hy; z0i  hy0; z0i for every y 2 Y would lead to z0 = 0, and we have that
(z0; k) 6= (0; 0). Thus, taking z0=k instead of z0, and denoting z0 again, we have
that
hy; z0i+ r  hy0; z0i+ ( (y0)  ")
holds for every (y; r) 2 A. In particular,
hy; z0i+  (y)  hy0; z0i+ ( (y0)  ")
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holds for every y 2 Y , and therefore
 (y)   hy; z0i+ hy0; z0i+ ( (y0)  ") :
Hence,
( z0; hy0; z0i+  (y0)  ") 2 @: (14)
Furthermore, (14) implies that
Sup fhy0; zi+ k; (z; k) 2 @g    hy0; z0i+ hy0; z0i+  (y0)  " =  (y0)  ":

A brief generalization
Lemma A6. If U is an open convex subset of the Banach space Y ,  :
U ! IR is convex and lower semi-continuous and
@U = f(z; k) 2 Z  IR; hy; zi+ k   (y) 8y 2 Ug ;
then @U is  (Z  IR; Y  IR) closed and convex, and
 (y) = Sup fhy; zi+ k; (z; k) 2 @Ug
holds for every y 2 U .
Proof. It is obvious that @U is  (Z  IR; Y  IR) closed and convex and
 (y)  Sup fhy; zi+ k; (z; k) 2 @Ug holds for every y 2 U . In order to proof
the opposite inequality, consider y0 2 U and " > 0.
Consider also
A = f(y; r) 2 U  IR; r   (y)g :
Since  is lower semi-continuous, there exists  > 0 such that ky   y0k  ;
y 2 U =)  (y) >  (y0)  "=2. We have that
A \ (B  ( 1;  (y0)  "=2)) = ?;
B being the intersection of U and the open ball with center at y0 and radius
. Indeed, if (y; r) 2 A and y 2 B then r   (y) >  (y0)  "=2. Therefore, the
Hahn-Banach Separation Theorem implies the existence of (z0; k) 2 Z  IR non
null and such that
hy; z0i+ rk  hy0; z0i+ k ( (y0)  ")
for every (y; r) 2 A. It is easy to see that k  0 since otherwise the latter
inequality could not hold if r ! 1. Moreover, k = 0 is not possible either,
since hy; z0i  hy0; z0i for every y 2 U would lead to z0 = 0 because U is open,
and we have that (z0; k) 6= (0; 0). Thus, taking z0=k instead of z0, and denoting
z0 again, we have that
hy; z0i+ r  hy0; z0i+ ( (y0)  ")
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holds for every (y; r) 2 A. In particular,
hy; z0i+  (y)  hy0; z0i+ ( (y0)  ")
holds for every y 2 U , and therefore
 (y)   hy; z0i+ hy0; z0i+ ( (y0)  ") :
Hence,
( z0; hy0; z0i+  (y0)  ") 2 @U : (15)
Furthermore, (15) implies that
Sup fhy0; zi+ k; (z; k) 2 @Ug    hy0; z0i+ hy0; z0i+  (y0)  " =  (y0)  ":

Theorem A7. If  : Y ! IR is convex and continuous then there exists an
increasing sequence (n)n2IN of CWCS functions such that
 (y) = Limn!1n (y)
holds for every y 2 Y .
Proof. It trivially follows from (9) and (13). Indeed, denote by Bn the
closed ball of Z with center at z = 0 and radius n, and dene
n (y) = Max fhy; zi+ k; (z; k) 2 (Bn  [ n; n]) \ @g ;
where @ is given by (12). 
Lastly, let us provide a Mean Value Theoremused in this paper. Indeed,
according to Balbás et al (2010), it is required in order to guarantee that (6) is
the dual problem of (4) and (5).
Lemma A6. If   Z  IR is convex and  (Z  IR; Y  IR) compact,
and  is a probability measure on the Borel  algebra of  endowed with the
topology  (Z  IR; Y  IR), then there exists a unique (z ; k) 2  such thatZ

(hy; zi+ rk) d (z; k) = hy; zi+ rk
for every (y; r) 2 Y  IR. In particular, taking r = 1,Z

(hy; zi+ k) d (z; k) = hy; zi+ k
for every y 2 Y .
Proof. If (y; r) 2 Y  IR then dene
L (y; r) =
Z

(hy; zi+ rk) d (z; k)
9
and we will have a linear and continuous function on Y  IR endowed with the
strong topology (recall that every  (Z  IR; Y  IR) compact set is bounded
due to the Banach-Steinhaus Theorem). Hence, since Z  IR is the dual of
Y  IR, there exists a unique (z ; k) 2 Z  IR such that L (y; r) = hy; zi+ rk
for every (y; r) 2 Y  IR. In order to prove that (z ; k) 2 , let us suppose
that the property is false. The Hahn-Banach Theorem implies the existence of
(y0; r0) 2 Y  IR such that
hy0; zi+ r0k > hy0; zi+ r0k
for every (z; k) 2 , which implies the contradiction
hy0; zi+ r0k >
Z

(hy0; zi+ r0k) d (z; k) = hy0; zi+ r0k :

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